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Abstract 
 
The energy market liberalisation process in Europe is increasingly 
focused on electricity market integration and related cross border 
issues. This signals that the liberalisation of national electricity 
markets is now closer to the long-term objective of a single 
European energy market. The interface between the national 
electricity markets requires physical interconnections and 
technical arrangements. However, further progress towards this 
objective also raises important issues regarding the framework 
within which the integrated market is implemented. This paper 
reviews the progress towards a single European electricity market. 
We then discuss the emerging issues of market concentration, 
investments, and security of supply as well as some aspects of 
market design and regulation that are crucial for dynamic 
performance of a single European market. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
At present, European electricity market liberalisation represents the 
world’s most extensive cross-jurisdiction reform of the electricity sector 
involving integration of distinct state-level or national electricity markets. In the 
US, in the aftermath of the California electricity crises in 2000-01, the 
restructuring process has slowed down significantly and many states have put 
their reform plans on hold. Apart from a small number of leading reform 
countries such as Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Argentina, many other 
countries around the world have made only limited progress towards 
comprehensive energy market deregulation along the lines now being pursued 
by the European Union (Jamasb et al., 2004). The Californian electricity crisis 
and the 2003 blackouts in New York and parts of Europe have clearly dampened 
political enthusiasm for reform.1 
Against this background of a world-wide slow-down in the pace of 
electricity reform, the centrally driven effort by the European Commission has 
been the main force that keeping the program on course. Electricity sector 
liberalisation is part of the wider trend toward liberalisation and the withdrawal 
of the state from involvement in infrastructure industries (Schneider and Jäger, 
2003). Given the strategic position of the electricity industry in national politics, 
in the absence of policy at the level of the European Union (EU), the pace of 
reform in many member states would have been considerably slower.2 
However, relative progress in liberalisation is not the same as the 
achieving an integrated European electricity market. This paper reviews the 
development and the state of electricity sector liberalisation in the EU, and 
discusses the prospects for further progress towards an integrated European 
market in the light of the remaining challenges. While individual countries have 
made substantial progress toward liberalization, the EU’s goal of a single 
European electricity market remains a long way off.3 
 
2. ASSESSING LIBERALISATION AND INTEGRATION 
 
Textbook microeconomic theory suggests that competition and the 
profit motive result in internal (production) and external (market) efficiency and 
that the benefits are passed on to customers and the economy in the form of 
lower prices and costs. The electricity supply industry (ESI) has important 
physical characteristics that shape its optimal regulatory design. It involves (i) 
                                                          
1 This is in spite of the fact that there seems to be little formal evidence of a connection 
between electricity reform and blackouts (see for example, Bialek, 2004). 
2 Unless otherwise specified, with the EU electricity market we generally refer to the EU-
15 countries plus Norway and Switzerland (EU-15+2) as the latter two are closely associated with 
the Union. Thus the 10 accession countries, mainly located in Central and Eastern Europe, are not 
included in the data we present here. 
3 The ideal of a single market within the EU is sometimes referred to as an ‘internal’ 
market, hence the titles of some of the relevant discussion documents. 
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large sunk costs which limit entry possibilities, (ii) vertical stages (generation, 
transmission, distribution and retailing) of production with different optimal 
scales, and (iii) a non-storable good delivered via a network which requires 
instantaneous physical balance of supply and demand at all nodes. Liberalisation 
of such an industry involves the creation of a combination of competitive energy 
and retail markets, and regulated transmission and distribution activities. 
Successful liberalisation requires well-organised energy, associated ancillary 
services and transmission capacity markets to achieve competition with physical 
balancing and appropriate regulation of monopoly power. 
Experience from electricity liberalisation around the world has 
produced a measure of consensus over some generic measures for achieving a 
well functioning market-oriented industry. Liberalisation generally requires 
implementation of one or more of the following inter-related steps: sector 
restructuring, introduction of competition in wholesale generation and retail 
supply, incentive regulation of transmission and distribution networks, 
establishing an independent regulator, and privatisation (Jamasb, 2002; Joskow, 
1998; Newbery, 2002a). 
Table 1 outlines the measures for reforming a vertically integrated and 
publicly owned ESI into a competitive and privately owned industry. In practice, 
the actual measures need to take into account both the specific characteristics of 
the national  (or supra-national region) electricity industry and the general 
features of the liberalisation model. 
 
Table 1: Main Steps in Electricity Reform 
- Vertical unbundling of generation, transmission, 
distribution, and supply activities 
Restructuring 
- Horizontal splitting of generation and supply 
- Wholesale market and retail competition Competition and 
Markets - Allowing new entry into generation and supply 
- Establishing an independent regulator 
- Provision of third-party network access 
 
Regulation 
- Incentive regulation of transmission and distribution 
networks 
- Allowing new private actors Ownership 
- Privatising the existing publicly owned businesses 
 
Liberalisation requires a suitable market structure within which 
effective competition can be fostered. Generally, this involves restructuring the 
sector by unbundling vertically integrated activities and reducing their 
horizontal concentration. The aim of vertical unbundling is to separate 
potentially competitive generation and supply from the natural monopoly 
activities of transmission and distribution networks. The aim of horizontal 
separation is to create enough effective competition in generation and retailing 
where economies of scale favour competition. In some circumstances 
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competition and/or efficiency may be promoted by increased horizontal 
concentration in retailing or distribution. This may be the case where large 
numbers of small distribution companies sell electricity (as was the case in the 
Netherlands until relatively recently).4 Consolidation in this case may yield 
economies of scale and increased extra-territorial competition. 
The effective separation of generation and transmission activities is 
crucial for achieving competition in the wholesale electricity markets (see 
Joskow, 2003b; Newbery, 1999) as this will help prevent anti-competitive 
behaviour by incumbent generators and ensure non-discriminatory network 
access to others. Failure to do so can prevent generators from participating in the 
market and will discourage new entry. Unbundling can take the form of 
functional, accounting, legal, or ownership separation, with the last being the 
most effective. Similarly, unbundling supply from distribution is important for 
effective retail competition. In Britain,5 following legal separation of these 
activities, some distribution companies decided to leave the retail market 
altogether, thus indicating the importance of effective legal separation that 
eliminated the scope for cross subsidies between distribution and retail.6 
Restructuring often involves horizontal splitting of incumbent 
generation firms or merging of retailing firms to change market concentration to 
theoretically and empirically competitive levels (usually thought to occur when 
the number of effective competitors in a market is at least five). In order to 
facilitate competition in generation in the short run and encourage new entry in 
the long-term, it is important to prevent high levels of concentration in the 
existing markets. Green and Newbery (1992) discuss the initial problems of high 
market power and concentration in England and Wales, which later led to 
regulatory-driven divestiture of significant amounts of assets.7 They show that 
prices in liberalised markets (such as England and Wales) are closely related to 
the number of players and the ‘tightness’ of the market i.e. the supply and 
demand balance. The combination of low price elasticity of demand and a small 
                                                          
4 See Arentsen et al. (2001). 
5 There are effectively three sub-markets in the UK- England and Wales, Scotland and 
Northern Ireland. The system of regulation is broadly similar for the whole of the UK but the nature 
of generation markets varies. In England and Wales there was a power pool until 2001 which was 
replaced by bilateral contracts and a balancing market. In Scotland there is considerable vertical 
integration between generation, transmission, distribution and supply, with separate nuclear plants 
supplying the two incumbents under contract. In Northern Ireland there has been a cost-based power 
procurement system based on the single buyer model which will not be replaced by full competition 
until 2007. In the text we use England and Wales, Britain (which further includes Scotland) and the 
UK where appropriate. 
6 For example, Western Power Distribution controls electricity distribution in two of the 
15 UK regions formerly controlled by incumbent distribution and retailing companies and it has no 
interest in retailing in the UK. However, vertical and horizontal separation affects the organisation 
and size of the activities and entities concerned. Joskow (2002) discusses electricity reform in the 
light of some characteristics of the sector i.e. limited adaptability of existing assets, and economies 
of co-ordination in vertical integration structures and argues that while reforms have improved 
operating efficiency, their long-term benefits for resource allocation are yet to be determined. 
Joskow suggests that a transaction costs approach to design and evaluation of electricity reforms be 
adopted and determine whether benefits of reform offset the increased transaction costs from 
unbundling. 
7 Initially two companies set the energy price in the UK power pool for bulk electricity 
over 90% of the time. 
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number of competitors means that market prices can easily deviate from 
competitive levels. 
Establishing wholesale and retail electricity markets is essential for 
liberalising the sector. Wholesale market design needs to take account of various 
technical, economic, and institutional issues associated with pricing, contracts, 
scheduling, balancing, and network congestion, taking account of the specific 
conditions of the sector (Hogan, 1998). Reforming countries have adopted 
different market models and these have evolved in stages, reflecting a learning 
process and a reminder that liberalisation remains a work in progress (Joskow, 
2003b; Wolak, 2001). 
Market participation and efficiency requires sufficient liquidity. 
Standardised contracts help liquidity, stability and facilitate investment to 
deliver adequate generation capacity. Borenstein (2001) explains how long-term 
contract markets and price-responsive demand can help reduce the volatility of 
prices and risk. Although large consumers have benefited from competition, the 
benefits of extending retail competition to include residential customers have yet 
to be firmly established (Joskow and Tirole, 2004; Joskow, 2003a; Salies and 
Waddams Price, 2004). In the long run, new entry in generation and supply, and 
interconnections with other systems can also increase competition in the market. 
Slow growth and excess capacity in many European electricity markets limit 
profitable entry opportunities for newcomers, and continuing high levels of 
concentration in generation and retail markets limit competition (Pollitt, 1999). 
Establishing an initially competitive market structure requires 
government initiative, and all examples of successful restructuring (England and 
Wales, Norway, Chile, Argentina and Australia) illustrate the importance of 
initial restructuring to facilitate competition. Where this did not occur, in Britain 
with the lack of competitors in generation, or in Chile with the continuing 
integration of some generation with transmission, ongoing problems were 
created for the regulatory system.8 Regulation can be very good at policing a 
competitive system, but it is difficult for regulators to engineer changes in 
market structure following liberalisation (the process of introducing competition 
into England and Wales generation took nearly 10 years and the separation of 
transmission and generation took 18 years in Chile). Maintaining competitive 
markets requires that the incentives for new entry are correct. The regulator 
needs to establish clear rules for the wholesale market and to minimise 
regulatory uncertainty (Alesina, et al., 2003; Ishii and Yan 2004). Where 
competitive and monopoly stages remain integrated, the regulator must ensure 
that there is real and non-discriminatory access to transmission and distribution 
networks for generators and suppliers. Regulated third-party access has proven 
the most effective and widely used approach to the provision of network access. 
The one country in Europe which did not adopt such a system at the beginning 
of its reform process, Germany, was forced to adopt it following multiple 
                                                          
8 See Pollitt (2004). 
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difficulties in competitive suppliers gaining access to incumbent company 
networks (Brunekreeft, 2002). 
Moreover, distribution and transmission charges typically constitute 
around one third of final electricity prices and vary by at least a factor of two 
across Europe. In addition, there is significant potential for efficiency 
improvement and cost savings in European networks, both within and between 
countries (Jamasb and Pollitt, 2003, find average cost inefficiency to be of the 
order of 40%). Advances in incentive regulation theory, such as yardstick 
regulation, attempt to mimic market competition (Shleifer, 1985). In recent 
years, at least 10 European electricity regulators have adopted incentive models 
based on price cap regulation and utility benchmarking (Jamasb and Pollitt, 
2001). 
The main perceived effect of privatization is that the pursuit of profit 
by private owners will lead to efficiency improvement and cost saving (Vickers 
and Yarrow, 1988). Many reforming countries have sold off public enterprises 
or allowed new private entry. An increase in sector-wide ownership diversity 
can also facilitate direct competition in the generation and supply activities and 
yardstick regulation of networks by comparative performance. Privatization can 
also provide significant proceeds for the government and reduce its future 
liabilities (Newbery and Pollitt, 1997). However, privatization is not a 
prerequisite for liberalization. In theory, competition and incentive regulation 
can be applied to publicly owned enterprises (e.g. Norway). However, there is 
significant evidence that privatisation does deliver benefits, especially when 
combined with effective restructuring, competition, and regulation (Newbery, 
1999; 2002a). 
The generation fuel mix can affect the process of, and potential gains 
from, electricity liberalisation for two reasons. First, dominantly hydroelectric 
and nuclear based systems with adequate capacity (such as in Norway and 
France) typically have low short-run system marginal costs considerably below 
long-run marginal costs. This can be a problem if investment planning is 
excessively influenced by the current low prices, rather than by efficient long-
run future prices, especially given the high capital costs and long lead times of 
nuclear and hydro investments. Second, liberalisation results in a market 
determination of new generation plant. This has tended to favour new gas-fired 
generation. Gas dependency raises security of supply issues, though this is 
initially mitigated by the inherited fuel mix within the generation portfolio. 
Drillisch and Riechmann’s (1998) study of energy liberalisation in Europe finds 
a positive link between import independence and liberalisation, while the overall 
energy independence index is more significant than the independence index of 
the electricity sector alone. This probably reflects a relative unwillingness 
among the import dependent countries to let the market determine the structure 
of energy imports. 
Liberalisation, through internal and cross-border competition, should 
lead to greater price convergence. The actual extent of convergence is, however, 
constrained by technological differences, interconnection capacity, the degree of 
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cost-reflective pricing, and variations in the efficiency and cost structure of 
transmission and distribution networks. Similarly, it is plausible that returns on 
investments will show signs of convergence. Also, capacity utilisation should 
improve while reserve margins will provide sufficient degree of security of 
supply. 
 
3. THE LIBERALISATION PROCESS AND CONTEXT 
 
Many of the liberalisation initiatives in Europe and elsewhere began in 
the early 1990s in an atmosphere of reduced political concern over energy 
supply security. The ending of the cold war made imports of gas from Russia 
less risky in an environment where liberalisation favoured the building of new 
gas-fired plants. An initial surplus of generation capacity supported the reforms, 
as there was no pressing need to ensure guaranteed returns to support new 
investment. 
European reform was pursued at two parallel levels. First, under EU 
Electricity Market Directives, member countries were required to take at least a 
minimum set of steps by certain key dates toward the liberalisation of their 
national markets. Second, the European Commission promoted efforts to 
improve the interfaces between national markets by improving cross-border 
trading rules, and to expand cross-border transmission links. Trading rules are 
being developed with industry agreement and the EU has subsidised some cross-
border transmission link upgrades (such as between Ireland and Great Britain). 
The underlying aim of both of these policies was to extend the principles of the 
European Single Market to the energy market by: the Directives would enable 
companies from across the EU to compete with national incumbents, while 
improved interconnection would reduce cross-border transport costs and 
increase competition. 
The first and second EU Electricity Market Directives of 1996 and 
2003 focused on unbundling the industry and on a gradual opening of national 
markets.9 The second directive further promotes competition by toughening 
regulation of access to networks and requiring independent regulators. 
Regulation of cross-border trade aims to facilitate market integration (Table 2). 
The second directive aims to achieve, by July 2007 at the latest: (i) unbundling 
of transmission system operators (TSOs) and distribution system operators 
(DSOs) from the rest of the industry, (ii) free entry to generation, (iii) 
monitoring of supply competition, (iv) full market opening, (v) promotion of 
renewable sources, (vi) strengthening the role of the regulator, and (vii) a single 
European market. 
In contrast to textbook models which regard an independent regulator 
to set the regulatory framework ex ante as a necessary first step, the EU focus on 
raising the standards of regulation came rather late, after the market structure 
and rules had been established. Thus in Italy and Spain, regulators are weak in 
                                                          
9 The texts of the Directives can be found at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/energy/electricity/legislation/index_en.htm. 
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the face of established incumbent company interests. In mid-2005, despite full 
liberalisation of the German electricity market, no central energy regulator had 
been yet established.10 Also, privatising state-owned monopolies has not been 
part of the EU-wide drive toward liberalisation of the industry. While the 
political rationale for this is understandable, it is difficult to see how state 
ownership of large incumbent electricity companies (such as in France) can be 
conducive to competition.11 These deviations from best practice reflect the need 
to avoid sovereign issues and reflect a pragmatic approach towards a collective 
agenda, rather than attempting to follow an optimum reform path.12 
 
Table 2: EU Electricity Directives 
Source: Vasconcelos (2004) 
 Most common 
Form pre-1996 
1996 
Directive 
2003 
Directive 
 
Generation 
 
Monopoly     → 
Authorisation 
                       → 
Tendering 
 
Authorisation 
Transmission 
 
Distribution 
 
Monopoly     → 
Regulated TPA 
Negotiated TPA 
Single Buyer 
 
Regulated TPA 
 
Supply 
Monopoly     → Accounting 
separation 
Legal separation  
from transmission 
and distribution 
 
Customers 
 
 
No Choice    → 
Choice for 
Eligible 
Customers (=1/3) 
All non-household 
(2004) 
All (2007) 
Unbundling T/D 
 
None             → Accounts Legal 
Cross-Border  
Trade13 
Monopoly     → Negotiated Regulated  
Regulation Government → 
Department   
Not specified Regulatory 
Authority 
 
3.1 The EU Generation Fuel Mix 
 
Although electricity generation remains heavily dependent on fossil 
fuels, there has been a steady decline in the use of coal and oil. In turn, natural 
gas and nuclear power have met the demand growth. The increase in natural gas 
use can be attributed to the development of high efficiency combined-cycle gas 
turbines (CCGTs) whose short construction times and low cost makes them 
attractive to liberalised markets, notable in Britain, Spain and Italy. However, 
                                                          
10 The current regulator for telecommunications and post will also assume responsibility 
for electricity and gas. The new regulatory authority (REGTP) is pending, waiting for the enactment 
of the new energy law (ENWG) in 2005. See Brunekreeft and Twelemann (2005). 
11 But see Glachant and Finon (2005), who discusses the proposed partial privatisation of 
EdF. This problem is not just confined to state-owned incumbents. The introduction of competition 
into already privately owned sectors such as in the US and Japan has been as slow as in many state-
owned sectors. 
12 This is most clearly illustrated in the case of France (see Glachant and Finon, 2005). 
13 Cross border trading rules are also covered by an additional regulation 1228/2003 on 
conditions for access to the network for cross-border exchanges in electricity. 
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the change in the overall fuel mix has been gradual; in particular non-hydro 
renewable energy remains low in percentage terms despite a rapid deployment in 
recent years (Figure 1). A simple Herfindahl-Hirshman Index as a measure of 
resource concentration or dependency shows some decline in reliance on 
specific sources in the EU (2,636 in 1990 to 2,253 in 2002).14 
 
Figure 1: Electricity Fuel Mix - EU-15+2 in 2002 (GWh) 
Source: Based on IEA (2004a) 
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Moreover, as shown in Figure 2, the distribution of generation sources 
across the EU is rather uneven. In principle, the resource diversity in the EU and 
across national markets implies a potential for improvement in capacity 
utilisation and efficiency through market integration and trade. 
The extent of cross-border trade is largely a function of available 
interconnection capacity, generation capacity, cost structure, resource mix, and 
regulation. The actual level of cross-border trade among the EU countries varies 
considerably (Figure 3). The figure also shows that smaller member countries 
exhibit a relatively higher trade in relation to their market size (notably 
Denmark, Switzerland and Luxembourg). However, the current level of total 
trade in the EU remains relatively modest, largely a result of capacity constraints 
in the existing interconnections. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14 Using data on the EU–15 +2 in seven generation fuel categories (coal, oil, gas, nuclear, 
hydro, wind, and others) from IEA (2004a). 
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Figure 2: Share of Electricity Supply Sources – EU-15+2 (2002) 
Source: Based on IEA (2004a) 
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
B elgium
Ireland
Greece
N ed
D enm ark
Italy
Portugal
U K
Lux
Germ any
Spain
Fin land
Austria
France
Sweden
Switz
N orway
Coal O il G as N uclear H ydro W ind O ther renew ables
 
 
Figure 3: Imports/Exports as % of National Consumption (2002) 
Source: Source: IEA (2003a) 
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3.2 Key Reform Steps in the EU 
 
Restructuring 
The aim of unbundling is to vertically separate the potentially 
competitive generation and supply functions from the natural monopoly 
distribution and transmission networks. Initial structural differences and the 
flexibility allowed by the first Electricity Directive have meant that member 
countries have adopted different approaches to separate these functions. 
Effective separation of transmission system operators from generation 
is important for effective wholesale competition. In the US, where the pace of 
restructuring has generally been slow, the relative success of wholesale 
competition in the Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland (PJM) system has been 
attributed mainly to effective separation of generation from other functions of 
the system (Joskow 2003b). Recognising this, the separation of transmission 
system operators has generally been more stringent than for distribution system 
operators, and more countries have applied ownership or at least legal separation 
rather than accounting or management separation (Table 3). 
 
Table 3: Unbundling the Networks (from Both Generation and Retailing) 
Source: European Commission (2005) 
 Transmission System 
Operators 
Distribution System 
Operators 
Austria  Legal  Legal 
Belgium  Legal Legal 
Denmark  Legal Legal 
Finland  Ownership Accounting 
France  Legal/  Management 
Germany  Legal Accounting 
Greece  Legal  None 
Ireland  Legal Management 
Italy   Own Legal 
Luxembourg  Management  Management 
Netherlands Ownership Legal 
Portugal  Ownership  Accounting 
Spain  Ownership Legal 
Sweden  Ownership Legal 
UK  Ownership Legal 
Norway  Ownership Legal/Accounting 
 
The legal separation of distribution network operator from supply is 
important for retail competition. This prevents the cross subsidy of retail 
customers by the distribution business of integrated operators. In the UK, non-
integrated businesses have successfully taken market share from incumbents. 
Centrica, the former gas incumbent, has a 25% market share of the residential 
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electricity market, while several other companies have built market share outside 
the geographic area of their distribution businesses. 
While the evidence from countries with successful liberalisation is that 
vertical separation of networks and competitive activities can yield significant 
benefits, vertical integration between retailing and generation appears to have a 
strong commercial rationale. This is because the supply risks inherent in the 
generation segment can be insured against by integrating into retailing. The 
benefits of such integration can be clearly seen in England and Wales where a 
recent collapse in the wholesale price of electricity drove a number of non-
integrated generators into bankruptcy while integrated utilities were able to 
maintain profitability and survive. 
Table 4 shows the extent to which countries have separated networks 
from competitive activities using four indicative criteria. The table uses five 
criteria reflecting ownership, accounting, regulatory, legal, and physical aspects 
important for effective separation. The table also shows that the extent of 
unbundling of the transmission system is generally higher than for distribution 
networks. 
 
Table 4: Extent of Network Unbundling 
Source: Based on European Commission (2005) 
 
Transmission 
System Operator 
Score/5 
Distribution  
System Operator 
Score/5 
Austria  4 3 
Belgium  4 3.5* 
Denmark   4 3 
Finland  5 1.5 
France  4 1 
Germany  4 1.5 
Greece  1 0 
Ireland  3 3 
Italy  5 3 
Luxembourg  1 1 
Netherlands 5 3 
Portugal  5 3 
Spain  5 4 
Sweden  5 4 
UK  5 4.5 
Norway  5 1.5 
• TSO: Ownership unbundling, Yes=1, No=0; 
  DSO: Legal unbundling, Yes=1, No=0 
• Published accounts, Yes=1, No=0 
• Compliance officer, Yes=1, No=0 
• Separate corporate identity, Yes=1, No=0, Often=0.5 
• Separate locations, Yes=1, No=0, Partly=0.5 
* Brussels region not yet legally unbundled and no compliance officer in 
Flanders region. 
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Effective competition may also require horizontal unbundling of 
companies in generation and retailing in order to reduce market concentration. 
Thus in England and Wales the largest generators were obliged to divest part of 
their plant portfolio to other firms, and later traded horizontal divestitures for the 
right to integrate into supply. The EU Directives have not required horizontal 
separation to control market concentration at the national or EU level. However, 
in order to meet market opening rules, ENEL of Italy (65 percent state-owned) 
has been required to sell off 15,000 MW generation capacity and EdF of France 
has auctioned some 6,000 MW generation capacity (42 TWh energy) per year. 
This strongly supports the view that a competitive market cannot operate 
without further changes in horizontal market structure in several of the most 
significant European electricity markets. 
 
Competition 
Despite a mixed ownership structure, wholesale competition is now 
complete in all member countries, and all large users and many small consumers 
can freely choose their electricity suppliers. The 2003 Electricity Directive has 
raised the standards for competition by ruling out the single-buyer model for 
distribution utilities (adopted by Northern Ireland, Portugal and Italy) and 
requiring regulated third-party access to distribution networks. 
 
Figure 4: Actual and Expected Levels of Market Opening (by units sold) 
Source: European Commission (2004b, 2005) and own Calculations 
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Most of the EU electricity market is, at least in principle, now open to 
competition. Although not yet required by the Directives, some countries have 
already extended market opening to households and have, thus, exceeded the 
required levels, as Figure 4 shows. Even in France, where liberalisation has been 
relatively slow and which is often regarded as a closed market, non-EDF 
suppliers serve about 15 percent of the eligible market (Glachant and Finon, 
2005). The 2003 Directive requires that all non-household customers can freely 
choose their electricity supplier by 1 July 2004, followed by full market opening 
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to include all household customers by 1 July 2007 (after a review to assess 
obstacles to the single market in 2006). 
Declared market opening does not necessarily imply effective 
competition and competitive prices. Achieving competitive prices depends on 
the number of players and the nature of consumer demand. The combination of 
low price responsiveness and a small number of competitors means that market 
prices can easily deviate from competitive levels. Currently, national electricity 
markets in many of the EU countries are dominated by relatively few companies 
and smaller consumers are resistant to switching.  
However, the benefits of extending retail competition to small 
customers such as residential users remains subject to debate (Joskow, 2003a). 
An active demand side can help to reduce the effect of periodic supply 
fluctuations. Von der Fehr et al. (2005) discuss the example of Norway, where 
during the winter of 2002-2003, residential users (most of whom had variable 
price contracts) responded to the sharp price increases in the spot market caused 
by low water levels in hydroelectric reservoirs by reducing their demand, thus 
avoiding blackouts. 
 
Regulation 
Although market structure is important in promoting competition, 
appropriate regulation, in particular, implementing regulated third-party access 
to networks, is important for effective competition. Recognising the importance 
of this, the 2003 Electricity Directive required member countries to establish 
independent regulatory agencies. 
Genoud and Finger (2002) observe a degree of convergence in 
European electricity regulation with the European Commission as an influential 
factor. Gilardi (2003), in a comparative analysis of independent regulatory 
agencies in the EU, observes that although there are variations in the degree of 
independence among the electricity regulators, they tend to be more independent 
than regulators in other infrastructure industries and comparable to those in the 
leading reform sector: telecommunications. 
In addition, incentive-based regulation of networks can promote 
efficiency and cost savings in the natural monopoly segments of the sector. In 
Germany, where there has been no independent regulator in place and, hence an 
absence of incentive-based schemes, the network charges have largely remained 
unchanged and are among the highest in Europe (see Figure 6). 
 
Privatization 
As mentioned, the EU Electricity Directives are silent on the need for 
private ownership. In Germany and Belgium, the industry was largely privately-
owned before reform. The most extensive privatisation programs have taken 
place in the UK and Portugal. Some countries have undertaken partial 
privatisation (e.g. Italy) while others envisage this as a possibility for the future 
(e.g. France). In these countries, private participation has been through entry by 
new firms. This approach avoids political sensitivities that could delay 
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liberalisation. In the Netherlands the transmission and distribution utilities 
remain in public ownership (van Damme, 2005). 
Splitting large companies to increase competition is easier at the time 
of privatization. In some countries, this has sometimes been resisted to avoid the 
possibility of national companies falling into the hands of large foreign 
companies (e.g. The Netherlands and Norway). Norway demonstrates that 
liberalisation does not require privatisation, as competition was introduced with 
predominantly state and local ownership, although this took some time to 
emerge (Magnus and Midttun, 2000). 
 
4.  EFFECTS OF REFORM 
 
Ideally we should be able to quantify the performance and effects of 
electricity reforms. However, it is too early to measure the outcomes of most 
European reforms, and it is in any case difficult to construct satisfactory or 
plausible counterfactual scenarios.15 The impacts on market structure are quicker 
to emerge and easier to measure. 
 
4.1  Market Structure - Mergers and Acquisitions and Market 
Concentration 
 
Not surprisingly the financial integration of electricity markets in 
Europe has taken place more rapidly than the physical integration of electricity 
power flows and networks. In the absence of proactive regulation and control of 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&As), European electricity companies have shown 
a marked tendency towards increased market concentration (Newbery, 2002b; 
Codognet et al, 2002). Increased market concentration or consolidation has 
occurred at both national and EU levels, and this may limit the effectiveness of 
competition. 
 
Horizontal concentration 
The legacy of pre-reform public ownership and centralised control 
through national companies (e.g. in France, Portugal, Italy, Greece and Ireland) 
has ensured that horizontal concentration remains high in many countries. While 
some reforms have led to significant reductions in concentration in generation 
and retailing (e.g. England and Wales, and the Nordic market), these remain 
exceptions rather than the norm. Among the EU-15, concentration in generation 
for the largest three generation firms remains above 60% in 10 markets (by 
installed capacity). In retailing there is a similar picture with the three-firm 
concentration ratio remaining above 60% in 12 markets (by number of 
customers).16 
                                                          
15 Newbery and Pollitt (1997) and Domah and Pollitt (2001) quantify reform effects in the 
England and Wales market on the basis of a careful reconciliation of the pre and post reform 
companies and the identification of a plausible counterfactual for what might have happened to costs 
and prices in the absence of reform. 
16 Concentration figures are from European Commission (2005). 
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In principle, with progress towards larger regional markets or the single 
European market, national concentration may cease to be relevant, given 
adequate interconnect capacity. However, horizontal cross-border M&As can 
offset much of the deconcentration effect of market enlargement. In the short run 
markets will continue to be primarily national (especially in the larger markets 
in the UK, France, Germany, Italy and Spain) where transmission links are not 
strong enough to reduce the market power of domestic incumbents. 
European utilities have been keen to position themselves in the new 
market and have moved more quickly that national and European decision-
makers. Some acquisitions have involved considerable premiums which reflects 
the acquiring firms’ expectations. As shown in Figure 5, more than two-thirds of 
the European market is now concentrated in the hands of eight large companies, 
with the Europe-wide four-firm concentration ratio at 50%. The current 
ownership structure in Europe constitutes a complex web including many partial 
shareholdings, which makes an analysis of their effect on the operation and 
further development of the European market rather difficult. 
 
Figure 5: Generation Market Shares in Western Europe 
Source: Codognet et al. (2002), Energia Klub (2002), and Own Calculations 
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Vertical integration 
In pre-liberalisation electricity sectors, vertically integrated structures 
had apparent economic and technical advantages and were a convenient 
organisational arrangement for state-owned sectors.17 Initial restructuring often 
attempted to reduce this. However, profit-oriented and privatised utilities have 
exhibited strong tendencies toward vertical (re)integration through domestic and 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As). Codognet et al (2002) show that 
vertically integrated electricity utilities have been among the most active in 
European M&As and have tended to acquire other vertically integrated 
                                                          
17 We discuss M&As in this section due to their structural implications for the national 
and EU market while recognising that M&A is an aspect of firm behaviour and a distinct component 
of the market structure-firm behaviour-performance of the industrial organisation paradigm. 
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companies. Bortolotti and Siniscalco (2004) find that vertical integration has had 
a negative and significant impact on the number of privatizations and the 
proceeds from privatisation. 
There is also a possible indirect link between M&As and investment. 
Allowing for some degree of vertical integration, for example between 
generation and retail supply, may lead to higher investment due to the risk-
reducing properties of such mergers. However, this poses regulators with a 
trade-off in the form of possible negative effects on competition. For example, 
in Great Britain, the retail supply margin appears to have increased with higher 
concentration resulting from M&As as the number of national competitors in 
supply falls and the degree of integration between generators and suppliers has 
increased.18 
Despite the obvious problems associated with increased market 
concentration, national and supranational regulators have been relatively 
inactive in tackling the issue (Thatcher, 2002). In some cases, the desire to 
create national champions that match their European counterparts may have 
constrained intervention to create a diversified ownership structure. 
M&A decisions are usually the responsibility of national competition 
agencies. As with the E.oN – Ruhrgas merger in Germany, which was deemed 
to have large anti-competitive effects (Brunekreeft, 2004), it is not clear that 
these agencies are sufficiently aware of the dynamics of competition within 
complex electricity markets. What is needed is a competent energy regulator to 
provide clear advice on such cases (Newbery, 2004). It is interesting to note that 
there was no national energy sector regulator to advise on the E.oN – Ruhrgas 
case which was first rejected by German Federal Cartel Office, only to be 
overruled later by the government. The European Commission did not intervene 
on the grounds that over two-thirds of E.oN’s combined European turnover was 
in Germany.19 
 
4.2 Sector Performance 
 
Electricity prices 
The performance of liberalisation can be measured in a number ways. 
The effect on electricity prices is, perhaps, the single most important 
performance indicator. A desirable outcome of the single European market is to 
achieve a lower average EU price and a degree of price convergence through 
wholesale and retail competition. However, this outcome is also dependent on: 
(i) fuel markets and, in particular, access to natural gas, (ii) competition and 
resulting price convergence in national gas markets, (iii) sufficient 
interconnection capacity, and (iv) EU-wide emissions trading creating 
                                                          
18 Since 1999 there have been several mergers of the supply companies of the former 15 
regional electricity companies in the UK reducing the supply companies to 6 independent groups. 
19 Though an earlier notification or completion of the subsequent acquisition of Powergen 
shortly after would have made this a case for the Commission as the cross-border merger size 
thresholds would have triggered an investigation. 
 17 
uniformity in emissions prices. In addition, incentive regulation can lead to 
minimisation and convergence of network charges. 
A price decline (or more accurately, a decline in the price-cost margin) 
may suggest that efficiency gains have been achieved and that the gains have 
been passed on to customers. Liberalisation may also involve rebalancing of 
tariffs for different customer groups as a result of cost-reflective pricing so that 
not all consumers will experience the same price changes. These trends are 
further complicated by changes in prices for gas, oil and coal. 
As shown in Figure 6, there is a significant variation in end-user prices 
in member countries, although this differential can be associated with different 
components of the final price. The figure shows convergence of generation price 
in the Nordic markets. Italy and Ireland exhibit notably high generation prices 
and retail margins.20 At the same time, Norway and UK as the countries with 
longest incentive-based regulation of networks, have among the lowest 
transmission and distribution charges. The UK also exhibits the lowest retail 
supply cost and margin. 
 
Figure 6: Estimated Breakdown of Expected Electricity Prices 2004 (50 
MWh/year Customer (euro/MWh, before Taxes) 
Source:    European Commission (2004b) 
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Figure 7 indicates a general decline in EU average electricity prices for 
major customer categories between 1997 and 2003. The reduction in average 
prices for households, small industrial customers, and large industrial users have 
been 6, 20, and 9.5 percent respectively. Also, the figure shows that the order 
and magnitude of the prices for these customer groups seem to have come more 
                                                          
20 It should be noted that generation fuel taxes vary across the countries (see IEA, 2004b). 
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in line with the underlying costs of supply, which would suggest that residential 
prices should be higher than small industrial prices. This appears to have come 
against a background of flat or rising prices for fossil fuels for electricity 
generation over the period.21 It also comes at a time when operating costs seem 
to have been falling in the electricity supply industry, combined with sharp 
declines in employment in recent years. Labour productivity in the utilities 
(including electricity) sectors has increased with about 30 percent between 1996 
and 2001 (European Commission, 2004a). While the overall trend price decline 
may have been due to exogenous technological changes, it is not inconsistent 
with the anticipated benefits of the implementation of the Electricity Directives. 
 
Figure 7: EU Average Real Price (2004 Euro per MWh) 
Source: Own Calculations Based on EU Data and Inflation Rate 
(Unweighted) 
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Figure 8 shows that during this period, the variabilities of national 
average prices for households and small industries have declined while the 
picture for large industries has, despite a general price decrease, been somewhat 
mixed.22 Active customer choice of electricity supplier is crucial for effective 
competition and for consumers to benefit from efficiency gains. 
Another indication of price convergence is the degree of price 
integration in the wholesale markets. The highly integrated Nordic market also 
exhibits high degree of price convergence. The level of price integration 
between other European markets is, however, generally low and reflects low 
interconnection capacity (Boisseleau, 2004: Bower, 2002). 
                                                          
21 There is only patchy data available on fossil fuel prices on a consistent basis (see IEA, 
2004b). Coal for electricity generation rose in Euro terms in most OECD Europe countries between 
1997 and 2002. Heavy oil for electricity generation and industrial natural gas prices have fluctuated 
over the period but are generally higher (in Euro terms) in 2003 than in 1997 for most OECD Europe 
countries. 
22 Price variability is measured by the coefficient of variation, defined as the standard 
deviation divided by the mean. 
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Figure 8: Price Convergence - Coefficient of Variation (CV) 
Source: Based on European Commission (2004b, 2005) 
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The number of customers that have switched suppliers or have 
renegotiated their contracts show considerable variation across member 
countries. As expected, large industrial users have been more active than other 
groups and have taken advantage of the market opening. However, with the 
arrival of full market opening from July 2007, an increasing number of smaller 
customers will be eligible to switch to a new supplier or to enter contract 
renegotiations (Table 5). 
 
Table 5: Customer Switching - % Switched / Renegotiated in 2003 & 2002* 
Source: European Commission (2004b, 2005) 
 Large Eligible Industrial 
Usersa 
Small Commercial / Domestic 
Austria (15%)  7% (5%)   1% 
Belgium (5% b)  8% 19% 
Denmark (45%)  22% 5% 
Finland (c)        16% (10%)  4% 
France  (15%)  n.k.  
Germany (20%)  n.k. (5%)    n.k. 
Greece (0%)    0%  
Ireland (20%)  6% (2%)    1% 
Italy (15%)  n.k.  
Luxembourg (10% d) n.k.  
Netherlands (20%)  n.k.             n.k. 
Portugal (10%)  7%             1% 
Spain (20%)  5%             0% 
Sweden (a)        5% (10% e) 10% 
UK (15%)  n.k. (12%)  22%  
Norway (12%)  15% (14%)  19% 
* 2002 figures in parenthesis. 
a In general refers to clients consuming more than 1GWh/year. 
b 40% have renegotiated their contract. 
c Most large users in Finland and Sweden tender every year for a new supplier. 
d 15% have renegotiated their contract. 
e Cumulative 40% since 1998. 
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Distribution and transmission tariffs constitute a significant share of 
final electricity prices and are not subject to competitive pressure. Efficiency 
improvements and tariff reductions require appropriate regulation. Figure 9 
shows that there is considerable variation in transmission tariffs across member 
countries. Although average transmission tariffs fell by 9 percent in real terms 
between 2002 and 2003, the spread between the tariffs scarcely changed (ETSO, 
2003 and 2004).  
In addition, distribution tariffs vary significantly across member 
countries, although these differences appear to be less than for transmission 
tariffs. There are also significant variations in distribution tariffs within 
individual countries (as can be seen in Figure 6 where the distribution charges in 
Germany are twice those in the UK and explain more than half of the differential 
in the final prices between the two countries). These variations might reflect 
legitimate cost variations or the use of distribution charges as local taxes by 
municipal owners. 
 
Figure 9: Comparison of Transmission Invoices (2003): Producers and 
Consumers Connected at EHV (Utilisation Time 5,000 hrs/y)23 
Source:      ETSO (2004) 
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High charges may also reflect unwarranted joint cost allocations within 
vertically integrated businesses cross-subsidising competitive segments such as 
retailing from monopoly segments. Independent incentive regulation promotes 
cost saving, and efficiency improvement in the networks and should prevent 
such anti-competitive cross-subsidies. Incentive network regulation has led to 
                                                          
23 Note that these figures are for large customers connected to the transmission system. 
The network charge figure in Figure 6 is for small industrial and commercial customers and includes 
both transmission and distribution charges. Hence the discrepancies for some countries between the 
two figures (e.g. Germany). 
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concerns about the effect on the quality of service, which exhibits variations 
both across and within countries (CEER, 2003). However, there appears to be no 
evidence of quality of service declining under incentive regulation. This is not 
surprising as quality of service is usually explicitly incentivised. 
 
Investment adequacy 
In the absence of central planning, the market is required to deliver sufficient 
and timely investments if liberalisation is to be sustainable. Insufficient 
investment is arguably the biggest concern raised by liberalised electricity 
markets. Assessing the incentives for future investment adequacy is difficult due 
to existing over-capacity. However, over time, as demand and supply move 
more into balance, new investment will be needed and will require an adequate 
return. Figure 10 shows that returns on investment in some of the companies in 
the largest member countries have been declining and converging.24  
 
Figure 10: Return on total capital OECD electricity companies 
Source: Standard and Poor’s (2003) in IEA (2003b) 
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It is expected that financial and physical integration would cause 
profitability to converge. It is more difficult to determine whether the return is at 
an efficient level and whether it will lead to sufficient new investment. In 
Norway in recent years, for example, the return on capital for electricity utilities 
has been lower than that of the manufacturing industries (von der Fehr et al., this 
issue). One question is whether electricity is less risky than other industries, 
justifying lower returns. 
                                                          
24 The rate of return is measured as operating income relative to total invested capital 
(long-term financing sources including equity and long-term debt) and refer to the company 
performance and include investments outside the home country. 
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The existing excess capacity in Europe and in important markets such 
as Germany and France, is expected to narrow in coming years (UCTE, 2003). 
Although some accession countries may also have some excess capacity, 
inevitably, much of the future investments in the enlarged European electricity 
will take place in liberalised markets. A period of high demand growth and 
sustained under-investment can eradicate the existing reserve capacity and 
threaten the stability of the system, especially where this is combined with a lack 
of political will to allow prices to rise. 
 
Security of supply 
Security of supply is important for maintaining a reliable and stable 
power system. In addition, security of supply has an important political and 
public opinion dimension. Significant supply interruptions and large price spikes 
can undermine support for liberalisation and integration. Current levels of 
reserve capacity in most member countries are not a cause for immediate 
concern (UCTE, 2003), though there are some exceptions. For example, Italy 
remains very dependent on imports because of limited available capacity and a 
lack of siting approvals for new power plants. 
Figure 11 shows changes in remaining capacity in the UCTE system 
between 1999 and 2003.25 Overall, reserve capacity in the post-liberalisation 
year appears to have been relatively stable. A closer examination shows that 
reserve capacity for the period between May and July 2003 is somewhat lower 
than previous years. At the same time, with the exception of February, the 
reserve capacity for the colder months of the year has generally improved. We 
note that this data is rather crude (it does not include intra-month peaks or reflect 
variations in the likelihood of an outage at the same measured reserve margin 
for example). A better measure would be given by the loss of load probability, 
but this figure is not readily available. 
Security of supply must be addressed at both national and at the EU 
level as it represents a common resource within an EU single market and, hence, 
is liable to exploitation. If every country relies on imports to meet peaks in 
demand, and peaks are correlated, such reliance involves a fallacy of 
composition. In the face of problems with siting of new plants and 
environmental concerns, easy access to imported electricity may be the path of 
least resistance. At the same time, visual impact (and associated NIMBY 
attitudes) may limit the expansion of interconnection capacity. Figure 12 shows 
the import and export flows of electricity as a percentage of national 
consumption for some key transit countries and for the EU-15+2 countries. As 
shown in the figure there has been a modest increase in cross-border trade as a 
share of consumption at the EU level, though a much greater increase for some 
of the selected countries. 
                                                          
25 Member countries in the Union for the Co-ordination of Transmission of Electricity (UCTE) are: 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Bosnia–Herzegovina, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, 
Serbia and Montenegro, FYROM, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovak Republic, Spain, Switzerland. 
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Figure 11: Remaining Capacity without Exchanges as Percentage of Total 
Generating Capacity in UCTE 
Source: UCTE (1999, 2000, 2003) 
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Figure 12: Import Plus Export Flows as Percentage of Consumption 
Source: IEA Electricity Information Database 
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Individual countries should maintain a degree of domestic energy 
security based on their degree of energy import dependency. In the short run, 
increased trade and interconnection capacity can lead to better utilisation of 
existing capacity. Recent problems between Chile and Argentina, where 
Argentina interrupted gas exports to Chile following a shortage of gas for 
domestic consumption, remind us that trade in energy is vulnerable (Pollitt, 
2004). The best insurance policies against interruptions in energy policy are 
effective crisis management at the EU level to allow optimal sharing of EU 
reserves and responsible national reserve policies. 
 
Environmental impact  
Nuclear plants currently do much to restrain carbon emissions from the 
power sector, and important decisions on their replacement will have to be made 
as they reach the end of their economic life or are phased out. Whether 
renewable energy sources can provide a substantial share of future electricity 
requirements is unclear. For example, maintaining the rapid growth of wind 
power will depend on the extent to which government support translates into 
suitable market instruments and institutions (including planning permission) to 
make development projects feasible and commercially viable (Wolsink, 2000). 
Competition and market risk can lead to a preference for less capital-intensive 
generation technologies with shorter construction time (Llamas and Stéphane, 
2000). The long-term effects of liberalisation on the choice of low-carbon 
technologies will depend on the level and predictability of the subsidy they 
receive. Many new technologies remain expensive per kWh (wind, tidal and 
solar PV) and have poor security of supply characteristics that require larger 
reserve margins and expensive system reinforcement. 
Member countries’ record of electricity generation from renewable 
sources is mixed. Between 1992 and 2001, the share of renewables as a 
percentage of targets for 2010 in seven member countries declined or remained 
the same. For the whole of the EU during the same period, the share of 
renewables increased to about 10 percent (European Commission, 2004a). 
However, progress towards target levels can be regarded as uneven (Johansson 
and Turkenburg, 2004). It is clear that liberalisation across Europe does not 
stand in the way of differences of national emphasis on renewables policy. 
 
Social impact 
Between 1996 and 2001, EU electricity prices have consistently 
increased at a lower rate than the consumer price index. During this period, the 
affordability index for electricity improved for all income groups in most 
member countries. In addition, consumers appear to be generally satisfied with 
service quality (European Commission, 2004a). Recent increases in fuel prices 
may end this benign period of declining real prices. The ability of regulators to 
pass efficiency gains from liberalisation to customers will be increasingly 
important for continued public acceptability of the liberalisation program and for 
further integration of European markets. 
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5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY LESSONS 
 
The efforts by the European Commission to move towards a single 
electricity market have focused on sector restructuring and competition in the 
wholesale market. The focus has increasingly been on regulation, access to 
transmission and distribution networks, and competition in wholesale markets 
and in retail supply. Overall, the centralised approach to market liberalisation 
through the Electricity Directives, based on stepwise progress and minimum 
compliance, has succeeded in maintaining the pace of reform in the original EU-
15 and in a number of associated and accession countries. 
Given the initial diversity across EU electricity sectors, the Directives 
have achieved a degree of standardisation of structures, institutions, and rules in 
national markets. Market opening has proceeded rapidly and in many cases, 
beyond the minimum requirements. Most consumers, and particularly large 
users, are seeing lower and converging prices. The productivity of electricity 
companies has increased, while their profits in the more competitive markets 
(such as in England and Wales), appear to have declined, reflecting continued 
excess capacity. 
The European electricity market is now approaching challenges where, 
in contrast to the consensus-based minimum requirements of the Directives, 
more specific and technical issues need to be addressed. Whereas general 
guidelines could be devised to achieve political consensus in the Directives, this 
is less desirable or feasible for the more technical aspects of market design. The 
case of California, where the failed market design was a product of political 
compromise to satisfy different interests, rather than an embodiment of technical 
and functional good practice, is a good example of this (Sweeney, 2002). 
The most plausible route to a single European market is through 
regional markets as an intermediate stage. There are several recognisable 
regional markets in the EU: the Nordic, UK-Ireland, Baltic, east European, west 
European, southeast European, Iberian, and Italian zonal markets. However, 
these markets vary in their degree of internal integration. The Nordic market is 
the most advanced in terms of effective international integration (with formal 
and common market rules and price convergence), while the Iberian market is 
still taking shape. The west European market (including France, Germany, 
Switzerland, Netherlands and Belgium) is the largest regional market, and its 
central geographic position implies that further progress toward an integrated 
electricity market in the EU will be dependent on the development of this 
market. 
Existing interconnection capacities are not sufficient to reduce the 
effect of concentration in national markets (European Commission, 2004b). 
There remain important investment and environmental issues that need to be 
resolved if capacity is to be increased. Individual transmission system 
enhancements require careful cost-benefit analysis. To have a real effect, the 
development of regional day-ahead and balancing markets also depends on 
adequate interconnection capacity. 
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Security of supply does not appear to be a fundamental problem at the 
moment. However, emerging regional electricity markets need to develop 
appropriate rules to ensure security of supply at the level of the region if the 
benefits of trade are to be realised, and free riding on the provision of joint 
security is to be managed. Thus measures such as capacity charges and 
interventions by national TSO’s in times of stress need to be agreed and 
harmonised at the regional market level if these markets are to develop 
satisfactorily. 
Mergers and acquisitions have resulted in increased and high 
concentration in the European electricity market, where some companies have 
strong ownership interests in neighbouring markets. The process of referring 
merger cases to competition authorities has been ineffective in preventing an 
unhealthy growth in market concentration. What is needed is better informed 
analysis of such markets by competent energy regulators, perhaps coupled with 
greater Commission pressure on national governments. 
The existing divergence of transmission and distribution network tariffs 
limits the convergence of end-user prices. It may also represent hidden cross-
subsidies being paid by monopoly network businesses to competitive generation 
and retail businesses, deterring competitive entry. Incentive-based regulation 
regimes have exhibited the potential to achieved efficiency improvement, cost 
savings, and the avoidance of such cross subsidies. However, these regimes are 
still being developed in many European countries. 
Finally, implementing and monitoring the progress of liberalisation and 
integration requires access to good data. In the post-liberalisation era, some 
types of data have been deemed commercially sensitive and are not made 
available even to regulators. There is a need for adequate disclosure to 
regulators, more transparency, and the collection and publication of new types 
of data. There is, for example, a shortage of data on ownership interests of 
companies, cost information, subsidies, and measures of security of supply. This 
is particularly true of data aggregated at the EU level and at the level of the 
emerging regional markets. Data collection requires continuity and commitment 
to achieve long-term benefits. Improving the quality of data requires joint effort 
and agreement on types of data needed, collection methods, and standard 
reporting formats. In some cases, commercial sensitivity and national 
confidentiality rules limit exchange of data between regulators and here the 
barriers for co-operation may need to be lowered through agreements and 
legislation. 
Liberalisation and integration of the European market is a continuing 
process and remains a work in progress. Gradual market evolution can create 
market uncertainty due to its slow progress to an uncertain end point. Increased 
uncertainty leads to strategic behaviour and raises the cost of capital, and 
reducing investment and entry in the short term, and lower innovation in the 
long term. While market concentration remains high and interconnection 
capacity inadequate to overcome this concentration such uncertainty is likely to 
continue. 
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